In articles published ten years apart in 2011 and 2021, Gur-Arye argues that when considering an agent’s explanation for doing something that looks, prima facie, like a criminal offence, we should distinguish between a plea of justification, and an assertion that one acted within one’s power. The former explains an agent’s reasons for having committed a pro tanto offence (i.e., actus reus + mens rea). The latter is a denial that the agent committed any pro tanto offence at all. In this piece, I build on Gur-Arye’s argument, suggesting that her claim about powers can be extended to all instances in which rights are displaced. I argue that in its expanded form, the practical significance of Gur-Arye’s claim goes well beyond what she identifies. It points to important and underappreciated points about the structure and classification of defensive claims in the criminal law, and helps identify errors in some arguments commonly made to support claims about disputed features of justifications.

在 2011 年和 2021 年发表的相隔十年的文章中，Gur-Arye 认为，在考虑特工对表面上看起来像是刑事犯罪的行为的解释时，我们应该区分辩护理由和断言某人的行为力所能及的范围内。前者解释了特工犯下原罪的原因（即犯罪行为+犯罪意图）。后者否认该特工犯有任何原罪。在这篇文章中，我以古尔-阿耶的论点为基础，建议她关于权力的主张可以扩展到所有权利被取代的情况。我认为，从扩展的角度来看，古尔-阿耶的主张的实际意义远远超出了她的认识。