This paper considers a new problem for desire theories of well-being. The problem claims that these theories are implausible because they misvalue the effects of fleeting desires, long-standing desires, and fluctuations in desire strength on well-being. I begin by investigating a version of the desire theory of well-being, simple concurrentism, that fails to capture intuitions in these cases. I then argue that desire theories of well-being that are suitably stability-adjusted can avoid this problem. These theories claim that the average strength of a desire, and the length of time that it is held, both influence the extent to which its fulfilment or frustration affects well-being. I end by considering whether value-fulfilment theories of well-being have a more attractive response to this problem. I find that these theories have significant downsides that make them unappealing alternatives.

本文考虑了幸福欲望理论的一个新问题。该问题声称这些理论是难以置信的，因为它们错误地评价了短暂的欲望、长期的欲望以及欲望强度的波动对幸福感的影响。我首先研究幸福欲望理论的一个版本，简单的并发论，它未能捕捉到这些情况下的直觉。然后我认为，经过适当稳定性调整的幸福欲望理论可以避免这个问题。这些理论声称，欲望的平均强度和持有欲望的时间长短，都会影响欲望的实现或挫败对幸福感的影响程度。最后，我考虑幸福的价值实现理论是否对这个问题有更有吸引力的反应。我发现这些理论有显着的缺点，使得它们成为没有吸引力的替代方案。