Peter-Paul Verbeek elaborates on the concept of “relational freedom” in Moralizing Technology (2011). In this paper, I propose to extend and reinterpret it as a concept of personal autonomy. Generally, studies of autonomy do not examine the use of technology thoroughly, because these studies mainly focus on an individual’s mental process regarding reasons or motives. Consequently, these studies fail to understand technological aspects that contribute to the agent’s actions and decisions. When we take into consideration that our autonomous behaviors and lives are highly intertwined with technologies, it becomes necessary to clarify the aspect of autonomy that relates to the use of technology. This is where Verbeek’s relational freedom comes into play. This is because it refers to the set of capacities to constitute one’s subjectivity in the process of deliberately using technological means. However, some conceptual analysis and critical discussion are necessary. The former includes whether it is a procedural or substantive notion. The latter consists of the problem concerning the correspondence between human participant(s) and a hybrid agent, and the difference between the hybrid agent and a moral subject.

Peter-Paul Verbeek 在《道德化技术》（Moralizing Technology，2011）中详细阐述了“关系自由”的概念。在本文中，我建议将其扩展并重新解释为个人自主权的概念。一般来说，自主性研究并没有彻底考察技术的使用，因为这些研究主要关注个人关于原因或动机的心理过程。因此，这些研究未能理解有助于智能体行动和决策的技术方面。当我们考虑到我们的自主行为和生活与技术高度交织在一起时，有必要澄清与技术使用相关的自主方面。这就是维贝克的关系自由发挥作用的地方。因为它是指在有意识地运用技术手段的过程中构成主体性的能力的集合。然而，一些概念分析和批判性讨论是必要的。前者包括程序性概念还是实体性概念。后者包括人类参与者和混合主体之间的对应问题，以及混合主体和道德主体之间的差异。