Individuals who are embedded in a social network decide non-cooperatively how much effort to exert in supporting victims of misbehavior. Each individual’s optimal effort depends on the contextual effect, the social multiplier effect and the social conformity effect. We characterize the Nash equilibrium, and we derive an inter-centrality measure for finding the key player who once isolated increases the most the aggregate effort. An individual is more likely to be the key player if she is influencing many other individuals, she is exerting a low effort because of her characteristics, and her neighbors are strongly influenced by her. The key player policy increases substantially the aggregate effort, and the targeted player should never be selected randomly. The key player is likely to remain the key player in presence of social workers except if she is becoming much less influential due to her closeness to social workers. Finally, we consider alternative policies (e.g., training bystanders for supporting victims) and compare them to the policy of isolating the key player.

融入社交网络的个人不合作地决定为支持不当行为的受害者付出多少努力。每个人的最优努力取决于情境效应、社会乘数效应和社会整合效应。我们描述了纳什均衡，并得出了一种中心间度量，以找到曾经孤立的关键参与者，该参与者可以最大程度地增加总努力。如果一个人影响了许多其他人，由于她的特征而付出了较低的努力，并且她的邻居受到她的强烈影响，那么她更有可能成为关键人物。关键球员政策大大增加了总体努力，并且决不应该随机选择目标球员。在社会工作者面前，关键人物很可能仍然是关键人物，除非她由于与社会工作者关系密切而影响力大大降低。最后，我们考虑替代政策（例如，培训旁观者以支持受害者）并将其与隔离关键参与者的政策进行比较。