We investigate privatization decisions in a mixed oligopoly market, with and without environmental regulation. We consider three agents: the manager of the public firm, the environmental agency, and the regulator choosing privatization levels; allowing them to assign different weights to pollution. When environmental policy is absent, we find that privatization decisions in equilibrium suffer from agency problems, yielding potentially inefficient privatizations. When environmental regulation is present and privatization decisions precede this regulation, privatizations have no impact on equilibrium output; while the opposite holds when environmental policy is chosen first. Our results, then, identify the presence of a second-mover advantage when asymmetric government agencies act sequentially.

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污染混合寡头垄断中的不对称监管机构：代理问题和后发优势

我们调查混合寡头垄断市场中的私有化决策，无论有没有环境监管。我们考虑三个代理人：上市公司的管理者、环境机构和选择私有化水平的监管者；允许他们为污染分配不同的权重。当环境政策缺失时，我们发现平衡状态下的私有化决策会遇到代理问题，从而导致潜在的低效私有化。当存在环境监管且私有化决策先于该监管时，私有化对均衡产出没有影响；而当首先选择环境政策时则相反。然后，我们的结果表明，当不对称的政府机构依次采取行动时，就会存在后发优势。