In this article, I argue that desire-satisfaction theories of well-being face the problem of trivially satisfied desires. First, I motivate the claim that desire-satisfaction theories need an aggregation principle and reconstruct four possible principles desire-satisfactionists can adopt. Second, I contend that one of these principles seems implausible on numerous counts. Third, I argue that the other three principles, which hold that the creation and satisfaction of new desires is good for individuals and can be called proliferationist, are vulnerable to an objection from trivially satisfied desires. They implausibly imply that forming desires that are trivially satisfied is good for individuals. Finally, I argue that trivially satisfied desires may also worsen desire-satisfactionism's classical problem of pointless desires. Together, these claims constitute a challenge to desire-satisfactionism.

在本文中，我认为幸福的欲望满足理论面临着微不足道的欲望满足问题。首先，我提出了欲望满足理论需要聚合原则的主张，并重建了欲望满足主义者可以采用的四个可能的原则。其次，我认为其中一项原则在很多方面似乎都不可信。第三，我认为其他三个原则，即认为新欲望的创造和满足对个人有好处，可以被称为扩散主义，很容易受到微不足道的满足欲望的反对。他们令人难以置信地暗示，形成微不足道的满足的欲望对个人有好处。最后，我认为，微不足道的欲望的满足也可能使欲望满足主义的无意义欲望的经典问题恶化。这些主张共同构成了对欲望满足主义的挑战。