Information asymmetry can affect the propensity of firms to pay dividends directly and indirectly by reducing the agency costs of free cash flow (FCF). However, designing a research framework to identify whether information asymmetry or agency cost directly explains the propensity to pay dividends is challenging, as both are partially endogenous. To overcome this challenge, this study investigates the role of two independent external shocks in explaining the propensity of firms to pay dividends. We use the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as an information asymmetry–reducing event and the global financial crisis (GFC) as an agency cost–reducing event to disentangle the effects of information asymmetry and agency costs. Using a large international sample of more than 100,000 firm-year observations and a matched sample of more than 35,000 observations, we find that the propensity to pay dividends declined after the mandatory adoption of IFRS and then declined further due to the economic shock of the GFC. We also provide evidence that firms facing high information asymmetry and high agency costs have a lower propensity to pay dividends because of the combined effects of IFRS adoption and the GFC. These findings suggest that the agency costs of FCF are more directly relevant in explaining dividend payout policy.

信息不对称可以通过降低自由现金流（FCF）的代理成本来直接和间接影响企业支付股息的倾向。然而，设计一个研究框架来确定信息不对称或代理成本是否直接解释支付股息的倾向是具有挑战性的，因为两者都是部分内生的。为了克服这一挑战，本研究调查了两种独立的外部冲击在解释公司支付股息倾向方面的作用。我们将强制采用国际财务报告准则（IFRS）作为减少信息不对称的事件，将全球金融危机（GFC）作为减少机构成本的事件，以理清信息不对称和机构成本的影响。通过使用超过 100,000 个公司年度观察的大型国际样本和超过 35,000 个观察的匹配样本，我们发现，在强制采用 IFRS 后，支付股息的倾向有所下降，然后由于全球金融危机的经济冲击而进一步下降。我们还提供证据表明，由于采用国际财务报告准则和全球金融危机的综合影响，面临高度信息不对称和高代理成本的公司支付股息的倾向较低。这些发现表明，自由现金流的代理成本在解释股息支付政策时具有更直接的相关性。