Lockeans regard taxation as a—perhaps sometimes permissible—infringement of moral property entitlements. This essay discusses whether, or in what form, this charge is defensible. In doing so, it will explore the truth and the limits of the conventionalist reply of Murphy and Nagel to Lockean challenges to taxation. It argues that there is a moral rationale for property conventions that is independent of the question whether and how one can acquire natural, pre-conventional property rights in the state of nature, that this rationale sets a moral standard for how good property conventions are and whether they are justifiable at all, and that once property conventions are in place, people’s moral property entitlements are at least partly determined by these conventions, sometimes even by unjustifiable ones that ought to be reformed. Because taxation can be a part of property conventions, taxation as such is not an infringement of moral property entitlements. But the essay will also argue that some taxation—excessive taxation—does infringe on moral property entitlements. This is because the moral rationale for property conventions sets some standards for what owners should be entitled to, and so excessive taxation will infringe upon moral entitlements that are partly not convention-based.

中文翻译：

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税收和公约的道德权威

洛克主义者认为税收是对精神财产权利的侵犯（有时也许是允许的）。本文讨论这种指控是否或以什么形式是可以辩护的。在此过程中，它将探索墨菲和内格尔对洛克税收挑战的传统主义回应的真相和局限性。它认为，财产公约有一个道德理由，它独立于一个人是否以及如何在自然状态下获得自然的、前习俗的财产权的问题，这一理由为财产公约的良好程度和如何制定了一个道德标准。它们是否合理，一旦财产公约到位，人们的精神财产权利至少部分由这些公约决定，有时甚至是由不合理的公约决定，应该进行改革。由于税收可以成为财产公约的一部分，因此税收本身并不侵犯精神财产权利。但本文还将指出，某些税收——过度税收——确实侵犯了道德财产权。这是因为财产公约的道德原理为所有者应享有的权利设定了一些标准，因此过度征税将侵犯部分不基于公约的道德权利。