When a non-climate institution, policy, or regulation corrects a pre-existing market failure that would be exacerbated by climate change, it may also incidentally induce climate adaptation. This regulation-induced adaptation can have large positive welfare effects. We develop a tractable analytical framework of a corrective regulation where the market failure interacts with climate, highlighting the mechanism of regulation-induced adaptation: reductions in the climate-exacerbated effects of pre-existing market failures. We demonstrate this empirically for the US from 1980 to 2013, showing that ambient ozone concentrations increase with rising temperatures, but that such increase is attenuated in counties that are out of attainment with the Clean Air Act’s ozone standards. Adaptation in nonattainment counties reduced the impact of a 1 °C increase in climate normal temperature on ozone concentration by 0.64 parts per billion, or about one-third of the total impact. Over half of that effect was induced by the standard, implying a regulation-induced welfare benefit of $412–471 million per year by mid-century under current warming projections.

当非气候机构、政策或法规纠正因气候变化而加剧的现有市场失灵时，它也可能顺便引发气候适应。这种调节引起的适应可以产生巨大的积极福利效应。我们开发了一个易于处理的纠正性监管分析框架，其中市场失灵与气候相互作用，强调监管引起的适应机制：减少先前存在的市场失灵对气候的加剧影响。我们从 1980 年到 2013 年对美国进行了实证证明，表明环境臭氧浓度随着温度升高而增加，但在未达到《清洁空气法》臭氧标准的县中，这种增加会减弱。未达标县的适应措施将气候正常温度升高 1°C 对臭氧浓度的影响减少了十亿分之 0.64，约占总影响的三分之一。超过一半的效果是由标准引起的，