This paper analyzes a regulator's optimal strategic delay of resolving banks when the regulator's announcement of the intervention delay endogenously affects the depositors' run propensity. Given intervention, the regulator either liquidates the remaining illiquid assets (“prompt corrective action”) or continues managing the assets at a reduced skill level (“resolution under receivership”). In either case, I show that if the regulator tolerates fewer withdrawals until intervention, the depositors may react by preempting the regulator: they run on the bank more often ex ante. A policy of never intervening can leave the bank more stable than a conservative intervention policy.

中文翻译：

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银行决议的最佳宽容

本文分析了当监管机构宣布干预延迟内生影响存款人挤兑倾向时，监管机构处置银行的最优策略延迟。如果进行干预，监管机构要么清算剩余的非流动资产（“及时纠正行动”），要么继续以降低的技能水平管理资产（“接管决议”）。无论哪种情况，我都表明，如果监管机构在干预之前容忍较少的提款，储户可能会先于监管机构做出反应：他们更频繁地事前挤兑银行。从不干预的政策可以让银行比保守的干预政策更加稳定。