We analyze a dynamic model of bargaining and war with two states located on a linear territory. One state demands a portion of the other state’s territory each period such that if the latter state makes a concession, the former state takes control of the demanded portion. If otherwise, the two states engage in warfare to decide which state controls the disputed portion of territory. À la Fearon, we consider a model in which the states bargain over objects that influence future bargaining power. That is, it is valuable to have more territory, not only because it brings higher utility, but also because it increases future bargaining power, as it can be used to generate military resources in wars to come. We implicitly characterize the unique Markov perfect equilibrium of the model, and utilizing a set of parameter values, we illustrate that there are six different types of equilibrium outcomes. We then provide a variety of historical examples and argue that our model is able to capture their patterns and characteristics.

我们分析了与位于线性领土上的两个国家讨价还价和战争的动态模型。一国在每个时期都要求另一国获得一部分领土，如果后一国做出让步，前一国就会控制所要求的部分。否则，两国将通过战争来决定哪个国家控制有争议的部分领土。费伦认为，我们考虑一种模型，在该模型中，各州就影响未来讨价还价能力的对象进行讨价还价。也就是说，拥有更多领土是有价值的，不仅因为它带来了更高的效用，还因为它增加了未来的议价能力，因为它可以用来在未来的战争中产生军事资源。我们隐式地描述了模型的独特马尔可夫完美平衡，并利用一组参数值，我们说明有六种不同类型的均衡结果。然后，我们提供各种历史例子，并认为我们的模型能够捕捉它们的模式和特征。