We examine the relation between voluntary disclosure and the value of analysts' research by studying the change in the informativeness of analysts' research after managers stop providing quarterly guidance to investors. We find that the market reaction to analysts' recommendation revisions increases significantly after guidance stoppage, controlling for confounding factors as well as for firm and time fixed effects. The increase in market reaction is greater for firms with more opaque information environments and for firms that previously provided disaggregated guidance. Further, the effect of guidance stoppage on the informativeness of analysts' research reverses after managers resume guidance. Finally, textual analyses of analysts' reports before and after guidance stoppage reveal that analysts issue longer, more frequent, and more detailed reports that convey more forward-looking information after stoppages. These findings collectively shed light on the relation between the supply of voluntary disclosure and the value that sell-side analysts add to price discovery in capital markets.

中文翻译：

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盈利指引的停止与金融分析师研究的价值

我们通过研究管理者停止向投资者提供季度指导后分析师研究信息量的变化来检验自愿披露与分析师研究价值之间的关系。我们发现，在指导停止后，市场对分析师建议修订的反应显着增加，控制了混杂因素以及公司和时间固定效应。对于信息环境不透明的公司和之前提供分类指导的公司来说，市场反应的增加更大。此外，在管理者恢复指导后，指导停止对分析师研究信息量的影响会逆转。最后，对指导停止前后分析师报告的文本分析表明，分析师在指导停止后发布了更长、更频繁、更详细的报告，传达了更多前瞻性信息。这些发现共同揭示了自愿披露的提供与卖方分析师为资本市场的价格发现增加的价值之间的关系。