We study a labor market in which two identical firms compete over a pool of homogeneous workers. Firms pre-commit to their outreach to potential employees, either through their informative advertising choices, or through their screening processes, before engaging in a wage (Bertrand) competition. Although firms are homogeneous, the unique pure-strategy equilibrium is asymmetric: one firm maximizes its outreach whereas the other compromises on a significantly smaller market share. The features of the asymmetric equilibrium extend to a general oligopsony with any finite number of firms.

中文翻译：

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市场力量不对称和工资抑制

我们研究了一个劳动力市场，其中两个相同的公司争夺一群同质的工人。在参与工资（伯特兰）竞争之前，公司通过信息丰富的广告选择或筛选流程预先承诺与潜在员工进行接触。尽管企业是同质的，但独特的纯战略均衡是不对称的：一家企业最大限度地扩大其影响力，而另一家企业则在市场份额上做出妥协。非对称均衡的特征延伸至任何有限数量企业的一般寡头垄断。