I defend a weak version of the Pigou–Dalton principle for chances. The principle says that it is better to increase the survival chance of a person who is more likely to die rather than a person who is less likely to die, assuming that the two people do not differ in any other morally relevant respect. The principle justifies plausible moral judgements that standard ex post views, such as prioritarianism and rank-dependent egalitarianism, cannot accommodate. However, the principle can be justified by the same reasoning that has recently been used to defend the core axiom of ex post prioritarianism and egalitarianism, namely, Pigou–Dalton for well-being. The arguably biggest challenge for proponents of Pigou–Dalton for chances is that it violates state dominance for social prospects. However, I argue that we have independent reason for rejecting state dominance for social prospects, since it prevents a social planner from properly respecting people's preferences.

我捍卫庇古-道尔顿机会原理的弱版本。该原则指出，假设两个人在任何其他道德相关方面没有差异，那么增加更有可能死亡的人的生存机会比增加不太可能死亡的人的生存机会更好。该原则证明了合理的道德判断的合理性，而标准的事后观点，例如优先主义和取决于等级的平均主义，是无法容纳的。然而，这一原则可以通过最近被用来捍卫事后优先主义和平等主义核心公理的相同推理来证明，即庇古-道尔顿的福祉。对于庇古-道尔顿机会论的支持者来说，可以说最大的挑战是它违反了国家对社会前景的主导地位。然而，我认为我们有独立的理由拒绝国家对社会前景的主导，因为它阻止社会规划者适当尊重人们的偏好。