We analyze the impact of board composition on the performance of companies controlled by public entities in Italy, using a reform-induced change. The law’s provisions, aimed at increasing female representation and at reducing the revolving-door phenomenon, were binding for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but not for companies with a minority share of public ownership, allowing to adopt a difference-in-differences estimation. Results show that female presence on the boards of directors of SOEs increased, while that of former politicians decreased. New directors replaced older and less talented men, thereby rejuvenating the boards and improving their quality. To assess the effects on firm performance, we analyze companies’ balance sheets and survey information on citizens’ satisfaction with the provision of local public services and on objective measures of their quality. While firm productivity remains unaffected, we find that profitability increases and leverage decreases, thereby lowering corporate credit risk, and that SOEs’ output quality improves (JEL G34, L32, H42).

中文翻译：

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国有企业董事会构成与绩效：准实验证据

我们利用改革引发的变化，分析了董事会组成对意大利公共实体控制的公司业绩的影响。该法律的条款旨在增加女性代表性并减少旋转门现象，对国有企业具有约束力，但对公有制少数的公司不具有约束力，允许采取双重差异的做法估计。结果显示，国有企业董事会中的女性人数有所增加，而前政客的人数有所减少。新董事取代了年长且缺乏才华的董事，从而使董事会焕发活力并提高了董事会的质量。为了评估对公司绩效的影响，我们分析公司的资产负债表并调查有关公民对当地公共服务提供的满意度及其质量的客观衡量的信息。虽然企业生产率未受影响，但我们发现盈利能力增加且杠杆率下降，从而降低了企业信用风险，并且国有企业的产出质量有所提高（JEL G34、L32、H42）。