In this study, we examine the influence of CEO general managerial ability on M&A voting events. The results indicate that CEO general managerial ability relates positively to M&A voting outcomes. Furthermore, firms run by CEOs with high levels of general managerial skill tend to enjoy better short-term and long-term stock performances. In addition, we find active funds to be more (less) likely to vote in line with the recommendations of the management of invested firms when market reactions around announcement dates are positive (negative). The main results are the same after using the state-level non-compete agreement to address possible omitted variable bias.

在本研究中，我们考察了CEO总经理管理能力对并购投票事件的影响。结果表明，CEO总经理管理能力与并购投票结果呈正相关。此外，由具有高水平综合管理技能的首席执行官经营的公司往往享有更好的短期和长期股票表现。此外，我们发现，当公告日期前后的市场反应为积极（消极）时，主动型基金更有可能（不太）按照被投资公司管理层的建议进行投票。使用州级竞业禁止协议解决可能存在的遗漏变量偏差后，主要结果是相同的。