Tullock contests model rent seeking behavior where agents exert unproductive effort to probabilistically win a fixed prize. Rent dissipation measures the social loss involved in effort exertion in such contests. Tullock contests are characterized by an impact function, which measures how effort impacts success, and a cost of effort function. If these functions are asymmetric and non-linear, then the contest cannot be solved in closed form. Hence, we approximate such contests with a large population contest, for which Nash equilibria and rent dissipation can be explicitly calculated. Rent dissipation is then the ratio of the effort elasticity of impact to the effort elasticity of cost. Greater elasticity of impact incentivizes more exertion of unproductive effort generating higher social loss.

塔洛克对寻租行为模型进行了竞赛，在这种行为中，代理人付出非生产性的努力来概率性地赢得固定奖励。租金耗散衡量的是此类竞赛中努力付出所带来的社会损失。塔洛克竞赛的特点是影响函数（衡量努力如何影响成功）和努力成本函数。如果这些函数是不对称和非线性的，那么竞赛就无法以封闭形式解决。因此，我们用大规模人口竞赛来近似此类竞赛，可以明确计算纳什均衡和租金耗散。租金耗散就是影响的努力弹性与成本的努力弹性之比。更大的影响弹性会激励更多的非生产性努力，从而产生更高的社会损失。