This paper examines whether the influence of banking regulation on banks’ risk is channeled through the quality of political institutions. As banking regulatory factors, we consider capital stringency, activity restrictions and supervisory power. The overall effect of banking regulation on banks’ risk is conditional on the quality of political institutions. Activity restrictions and capital stringency have a statistically significant positive effect on banks’ risk. This effect is mitigated by better political institutions. In contrast, stringent supervisory power tends to reduce banks’ risk, and better political institutions reinforce this effect. The results are robust for alternative estimation methods and risk measures.

本文探讨了银行监管对银行风险的影响是否通过政治制度的质量来传导。作为银行监管因素，我们考虑资本紧缩、活动限制和监管权力。银行监管对银行风险的总体影响取决于政治制度的质量。活动限制和资本紧缩对银行风险具有统计上显着的积极影响。更好的政治制度可以减轻这种影响。相比之下，严格的监管权力往往会降低银行的风险，而更好的政治制度会强化这种效果。结果对于替代估计方法和风险度量是稳健的。