A fraud mechanism, where managers inflate stock prices via misreporting for post-misreporting insider trading, is well captured by the delta of their equity portfolio. But a widely accepted view in the literature is that the impact of delta on misreporting is unclear because delta-related rewards (e.g., gains from insider trading) and risks (e.g., detection of fraud) likely offset each other. In this paper, we predict and find a concave association between managers’ portfolio delta and misreporting propensity, and the misreporting curve’s changing maximum points depending on the levels of various risk and reward factors. Our results are consistent with managers who reduce opportunistic misreporting at a higher level of equity incentives to avoid the increasing marginal costs of misreporting.

一种欺诈机制，即管理者通过误报后误报内幕交易来抬高股价，其股票投资组合的德尔塔很好地体现了这一机制。但文献中广泛接受的观点是，Delta 对误报的影响尚不清楚，因为与 Delta 相关的奖励（例如，内幕交易收益）和风险（例如，欺诈检测）可能会相互抵消。在本文中，我们预测并发现了管理者的投资组合增量与误报倾向之间的凹关联，以及误报曲线根据各种风险和回报因素的水平而变化的最大点。我们的结果与管理者在更高水平的股权激励下减少机会主义误报以避免误报边际成本增加的结果是一致的。