Based on a licensing model where a licensor (an innovator) is itself a producer in the product market, this research investigates the endogenous timing of setting a quantity (price) under unit-royalty licensing, fixed-fee licensing, and two-part tariff licensing contracts. We demonstrate that the results of equilibrium timing depend on the various payment terms of a licensing contract as well as the innovation size. For the fixed-fee licensing contract, both firms play a simultaneous game under Cournot competition and play a sequential game under Bertrand competition. In contrast, both firms play a sequential game under Cournot competition and play a simultaneous game under Bertrand competition when the innovator licenses via a unit-royalty licensing contract and the innovation size is relatively large.

基于许可人（创新者）本身就是产品市场生产者的许可模式，本研究调查了单位特许权使用费许可、固定费用许可和两部分关税下设定数量（价格）的内生时机许可合同。我们证明，均衡时间的结果取决于许可合同的各种付款条件以及创新规模。对于固定费用许可合同，两家公司在古诺竞争下进行同时博弈，并在伯特兰竞争下进行连续博弈。相比之下，当创新者通过单位特许权使用费许可合同进行许可且创新规模相对较大时，两家公司在古诺竞争下进行顺序博弈，并在伯特兰竞争下进行同时博弈。