This article analyses the optimal punishment structure set by a regulator in banking markets under asymmetric information. Relying on a theoretical model, we analyse whether a decreasing, constant, or increasing sanction scheme deters potentially repeated offences in banking. We find that an increasing punishment structure is efficient in reducing gambling bank behaviour. This holds if and only if the regulator’s detection probability is low or the amount gambled by the bank, if it would cheat, is high. With this paper, we provide justification for the current policy practice.

中文翻译：

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赌博银行行为、激励机制和制裁：两阶段模型

本文分析了信息不对称下银行市场监管机构设定的最优惩罚结构。依靠理论模型，我们分析了减少、恒定或增加的制裁方案是否能阻止银行业潜在的重复犯罪行为。我们发现，增加惩罚结构可以有效减少银行的赌博行为。当且仅当监管机构的检测概率较低或银行的赌博金额（如果银行作弊）较高时，这一点才成立。通过本文，我们为当前的政策实践提供了理由。