The distinction between the personal and the subpersonal is often invoked in philosophy of psychology but remains surrounded by confusion. Building on recent work by Zoe Drayson, this paper aims to help further improve this situation by offering a satisfactory explication of the distinction that remains close to Dennett's original intentions. Reasons are offered for construing the distinction as applying to representational (as opposed to worldly) items, for not building contested theoretical assumptions into it, and for taking it to apply in the first instance to descriptive statements and only derivatively to explanations. An explication of the distinction that accords with these points is then developed, according to which the distinction should be drawn in terms of what personal and subpersonal-level statements are ‘transparently about’. The theoretical role of this explication is discussed, and potential objections are addressed.

中文翻译：

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重新审视个人/次个人的区别：走向解释

个人与次个人之间的区别经常在心理学哲学中被引用，但仍然充满混乱。本文以佐伊·德雷森 (Zoe Drayson) 最近的工作为基础，旨在通过对这种区别提供令人满意的解释来帮助进一步改善这种情况，这种解释仍然接近丹尼特的初衷。提出了将这种区别解释为适用于代表性（而不是世俗）项目、不将有争议的理论假设纳入其中以及将其首先适用于描述性陈述并且仅适用于解释的原因。然后根据这些观点对区别进行解释，根据这种区别，应该根据个人和次个人层面的陈述“透明地涉及”什么来进行区分。