While nostalgia has been the subject of some philosophical treatment (especially in the phenomenological tradition), I think new findings in the psychological literature and new historical investigations call for a re-interrogation of this phenomenon. My argument is that philosophical reflection, as well as findings from empirical psychology, gives us strong reasons to think that: (1) Nostalgic experiences can be divided between typical nostalgic experiences that are positive and strengthen our sense of narrative identity by connecting us to an idealized past that we have a sense that we have lived. These typical nostalgia experiences are affectively bittersweet (though more sweet than bitter) and, as psychological literature attests, seem to arise in the wake of a crisis—and from this crisis, nostalgia attempts to make us feel at home in the world again. (2) In contrast to typical forms of nostalgia, there are what I call atypical forms of nostalgia; in these cases, the experiences are often negative, and they connect us not to a past that we have lived but to one that we wished to have lived. This form of nostalgia leads not to a strengthening of narrative identity but a weakening of it, and a feeling of grief for the world in which we could not belong.

虽然怀旧一直是一些哲学治疗的主题（特别是在现象学传统中），但我认为心理学文献中的新发现和新的历史调查要求重新审视这一现象。我的观点是，哲学反思以及经验心理学的发现使我们有充分的理由认为：（1）怀旧体验可以分为两种典型的怀旧体验，这些体验是积极的，并通过将我们与某个事物联系起来来加强我们的叙事认同感。理想化的过去让我们有一种我们曾经生活过的感觉。这些典型的怀旧体验在情感上是苦乐参半的（尽管甜多于苦），并且正如心理学文献所证明的那样，似乎是在危机之后出现的——而从这场危机中，怀旧试图让我们再次在这个世界上感到宾至如归。（2）与典型的怀旧形式相反，还有我所说的非典型怀旧形式；在这些情况下，这些经历往往是负面的，它们将我们与我们所经历的过去联系起来，而不是与我们希望经历的过去联系起来。这种形式的怀旧不会导致叙事身份的加强，而是会削弱它，并对我们无法归属的世界产生悲伤感。