Several enactive-phenomenological perspectives have pointed to affectivity as a central aspect of mental disorders. Indeed, from an enactive perspective, sense-making is an inherently affective process. A question remains on the role of different forms of affective experiences (i.e., existential feelings, atmospheres, moods, and emotions) in sense-making and, consequently, in mental disorders. This work elaborates on the enactive perspective on mental disorders by attending to the primordial role of affectivity in the self-individuation process. Inspired by Husserl’s genetic methodology and Simondonian philosophy of individuation, sense-making is described as the process of progressive concretization and structuration of the self-world structures that support the intentionality of conscious experiences. Accordingly, affectivity is described as the force that anticipates a partial self-world coherence in sense-making. Structurally different types of affective experiences are integrated into the genetic picture and, on this basis, a reinterpretation and classification of certain mental disorders, such as schizophrenia, depression, and the anxiety spectrum, is provided. In this way, this work contributes to a phenomenologically informed enactive account of mental disorders as disorders of affectivity.

一些主动现象学观点指出情感是精神障碍的一个核心方面。事实上，从积极的角度来看，意义建构本质上是一个情感过程。不同形式的情感体验（即存在感受、气氛、心境和情感）在意义建构中以及因此在精神障碍中的作用仍然是一个问题。这项工作通过关注情感在自我个性化过程中的原始作用，详细阐述了对精神障碍的积极观点。受胡塞尔的发生方法论和西蒙东个体化哲学的启发，意义建构被描述为支持意识体验的意向性的自我世界结构的逐步具体化和结构化的过程。因此，情感被描述为在意义建构中预期自我世界部分一致性的力量。将结构上不同类型的情感体验整合到遗传图谱中，并在此基础上对某些精神障碍（如精神分裂症、抑郁症和焦虑症）进行重新解释和分类。通过这种方式，这项工作有助于从现象学角度对精神障碍作为情感障碍进行积极的解释。