In this paper I examine the relationship between the principle of right and the principle of morals [Sitten] in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. My interpretation denies that the principle of right is derived from the categorical imperative, but neither does it adhere to the independence thesis. I present a third way of understanding the relationship between the law of right and the universal law of morals: the latter is needed in order to formulate the former, but it is not sufficient. The principle of right is obtained by applying the categorical imperative to the concept of right. I highlight the discussion on the subject within the late eighteenth-century German natural law tradition and similar arguments found in Achenwall.

中文翻译：

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权利、道德和绝对命令

在本文中，我探讨了权利原则与道德原则之间的关系。西滕] 在康德的道德形而上学。我的解释否认权利原则源于绝对命令，但也不遵循独立命题。我提出了第三种理解权利法与普遍道德法之间关系的方法：为了制定前者，需要后者，但这还不够。权利原则是通过将绝对命令应用于权利概念而获得的。我强调了十八世纪末德国自然法传统中关于这个主题的讨论以及阿亨瓦尔中发现的类似论点。