By considering combinations of a lump-sum fee and a per-unit royalty as licensing schemes in the transfer of new technology through licensing from a technology holder to oligopolistic firms, we investigate stable licensing schemes that are realized as bargaining outcomes. The licensing schemes agreeable to both the technology holder and licensees are necessarily rejection-proof; that is, no subgroup of licensees has an incentive to reject the licensing schemes. We newly define the rejection-proof core for each group of licensees as the set of rejection-proof licensing schemes for its group that are not dominated by any other rejection-proof licensing schemes for any licensees' group. Our principal findings are as follows: For the group of licensees that maximizes the sum of the technology holder's (gross) profit and licensees' total surplus, the rejection-proof core is always nonempty. Furthermore, from the perspective of profit maximization, the nonempty rejection-proof cores suggest that the technology holder should license the new technology to such a group.

中文翻译：

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稳定的技术转让许可计划

通过考虑一次性费用和单位特许权使用费的组合作为通过从技术持有者向寡头垄断企业进行许可来转让新技术的许可方案，我们研究了作为讨价还价结果而实现的稳定许可方案。技术持有者和被许可人双方都同意的许可方案必然是不会被拒绝的；也就是说，任何被许可人小组都没有动机拒绝许可计划。我们新地将每组被许可人的防拒绝核心定义为其组的一组防拒绝许可方案，该组不被任何被许可人组的任何其他防拒绝许可方案所支配。我们的主要发现如下：对于使技术持有者（毛）利润和被许可人总盈余之和最大化的被许可人群体，防拒绝核心始终是非空的。此外，从利润最大化的角度来看，非空防拒绝核心表明技术持有者应该将新技术许可给这样的群体。