We analyze the equilibrium in the credit market when a bank and a lending platform compete to offer credit to borrowers. The platform does not manage deposit accounts, but acts as an intermediary between the borrower and investor, offering a risky contract such that the investor is only reimbursed if the borrower is successful. We show that the platform business model of financial intermediation may generate unexpected effects in the credit market. In particular, investor participation in the platform sometimes decreases when the platform attracts better-quality borrowers. When it competes with the platform, depending on the respective distributions of borrower and investor types, the bank may expand the supply of credit to low-quality borrowers, or restrict it to high-quality borrowers. Bank-platform competition expands the total supply of credit, but has an ambiguous impact on borrower surplus, because some borrowers may have higher repayments.

我们分析当银行和贷款平台竞争向借款人提供信贷时信贷市场的均衡情况。该平台不管理存款账户，而是充当借款人和投资者之间的中介，提供有风险的合同，只有在借款人成功的情况下，投资者才能得到补偿。我们表明，金融中介的平台商业模式可能会对信贷市场产生意想不到的影响。特别是，当平台吸引更优质的借款人时，投资者对平台的参与有时会减少。在与平台竞争时，根据借款人和投资者类型的各自分布，银行可能会扩大对低质量借款人的信贷供应，或限制对高质量借款人的信贷供应。银行平台竞争扩大信贷总量，