In this study, we introduce a novel spatial framework to examine the impact of the aggregate shock and social distancing policies stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic on banks' incentives to monitor entrepreneurs. Our findings reveal that banks raise their loan rates to compensate for losses caused by the aggregate shock, which, in turn, enhances their monitoring efforts. However, the default probability still rises. The government's expansionary monetary policy, implemented in response to the COVID-19 crisis, can help mitigate these effects. Additionally, social distancing measures have led to either increased customer service or higher preparation costs for entrepreneurs seeking loans, both of which ultimately benefit the banks' monitoring efforts. We further explore social welfare analysis, the role of capital regulation, and several other relevant extensions.

在这项研究中，我们引入了一种新颖的空间框架，以研究 COVID-19 大流行引发的总体冲击和社会疏远政策对银行监控企业家的激励的影响。我们的研究结果表明，银行提高贷款利率是为了弥补总体冲击造成的损失，这反过来又加强了监管力度。然而，违约概率仍然上升。政府为应对 COVID-19 危机而实施的扩张性货币政策有助于减轻这些影响。此外，社交距离措施导致客户服务增加或寻求贷款的企业家的准备成本增加，这两者最终都有利于银行的监控工作。我们进一步探讨社会福利分析、资本监管的作用、