Each state offers a standard marital contract and controls access to it. Married couples enjoy many benefits under U.S. federal and state laws, such as veteran and military pensions, immigration preference, Social Security payments, and tax deductions. Although many of these benefits were introduced for other purposes, we argue that the growth in welfare programs indirectly increased the value of the marital contract over time. In 2015, the Supreme Court ruled that same-sex couples could now access marital contracts—and consequently the benefits tied to marital status—in all 50 U.S. states. We view the legalization of same-sex marriage as the predictable supply response to an increase in the demand for access to the marital contract, which followed from an increase in its value over time. We test this hypothesis at both state and federal levels. Using cross-sectional data at the state level, we show that variation in state spending on benefits can explain variation in the length of years that same-sex marriage was legalized in a state prior to Obergefell. At the federal level, we show how federal expansions of benefits over time corresponded to increased expenditures on lobbying for same-sex marriage.

每个州都提供标准婚姻合同并控制对其的访问。根据美国联邦和州法律，已婚夫妇享有许多福利，例如退伍军人和军人养老金、移民优惠、社会保障金和税收减免。尽管其中许多福利是出于其他目的而引入的，但我们认为，随着时间的推移，福利计划的增长间接增加了婚姻契约的价值。2015 年，最高法院裁定，在美国所有 50 个州，同性伴侣现在可以获得婚姻合同，从而获得与婚姻状况相关的福利。我们认为同性婚姻合法化是对婚姻合同需求增加的可预测的供给反应，而婚姻合同的价值随着时间的推移而增加。我们在州和联邦层面检验了这一假设。奥伯格菲尔。在联邦层面，我们展示了联邦福利随着时间的推移而扩大是如何与游说同性婚姻的支出增加相对应的。