According to Lea Ypi, Kant’s attempt in the first Critique to unify reason via the practical route fails because his notion of purposiveness as design commits him to a dogmatic metaphysics. I challenge this claim on two grounds. First, I argue that practical reason does not have an interest in a strong modal connection that guarantees the unity of freedom and nature rather than a weak modal connection that merely affirms the possibility of our ends. Second, I highlight that the epistemic status of practical ideas is one of faith or hope rather than knowledge. Hence, Kant’s attempt to unify reason via the practical route can be reconstructed in a way that is largely in line with the commitments of his critical philosophy.

根据 Lea Ypi 的说法，康德在第一次批判中通过实践路线统一理性的尝试失败了，因为他的设计目的性概念使他陷入了教条形而上学。我基于两个理由质疑这一说法。首先，我认为实践理性对保证自由与自然统一的强模态联系不感兴趣，而不是对仅仅肯定我们目标的可能性的弱模态联系感兴趣。其次，我强调实践思想的认知地位是信仰或希望而不是知识。因此，康德通过实践路线统一理性的尝试可以以一种很大程度上符合他的批判哲学承诺的方式来重建。