Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to explore board functions and their location in family firms.

Design/methodology/approach

Through structured induction in a four-case study of medium-sized Swedish family firms, the authors demonstrate that board functions can be located in other arenas than in the common board and suggest propositions that explain their distribution.

Findings

(1) The board is but one of several arenas where board functions are performed. (2) The functions performed by the board vary in type and emphasis. (3) The non-family directors in a family firm serve the owners, even sometimes governing them, in what the authors term “bidirectional governance”. (4) The kin strategy of the family influences their governance. (5) The utilization of a board for governance stems from the family (together with its constitution, kin strategy and governance strategy), the board composition and the business conditions of the firm.

Research limitations/implications

Being a case study the findings are restricted to concepts and theoretical propositions. Using structured induction, the study is not solely inductive but still contains the subjectivity of induction.

Practical implications

Governance agents should have an instrumental view on the board, considering it one possible governance arena among others, thereby economizing on governance.

Social implications

The institutional pressure toward active boards could paradoxically reduce the importance of the board in family firms.

Originality/value

The board of a family company differs in its emphasis of board functions and these functions are performed with varying emphases in different governance arenas. The authors propose the concept of kin strategy, which refers to the governance importance of the structure of the owner and observations on bi-directional governance, indicating that the board can govern the owners.

中文翻译：

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治理领域的董事会职能：四家瑞典家族企业的比较案例研究

目的

本文的目的是探讨董事会职能及其在家族企业中的定位。

设计/方法论/途径

通过对瑞典中型家族企业的四个案例研究的结构化归纳，作者证明董事会职能可以位于共同董事会之外的其他领域，并提出解释其分布的命题。

发现

(1) 董事会只是履行董事会职能的几个场所之一。(2) 董事会履行的职能类型和侧重点各不相同。(3) 家族企业中的非家族董事为所有者服务，有时甚至管理所有者，即作者所说的“双向治理”。(4)家族的亲属策略影响其治理。（5）利用董事会进行治理源于家族（连同其章程、亲属策略和治理策略）、董事会的组成和公司的经营状况。

研究局限性/影响

作为案例研究，研究结果仅限于概念和理论命题。采用结构化归纳法，研究不仅是归纳性的，而且还包含归纳性的主观性。

实际影响

治理代理人应该对董事会有一个有用的观点，将其视为一个可能的治理领域，从而节省治理。

社会影响

矛盾的是，对活跃董事会的制度压力可能会降低董事会在家族企业中的重要性。

原创性/价值

家族企业的董事会在其职能的侧重点上有所不同，并且这些职能在不同治理领域的履行侧重点有所不同。作者提出亲缘战略的概念，指的是所有者结构的治理重要性和双向治理的观察，表明董事会可以对所有者进行治理。