In this paper, I analyse the representation of reported discourse in testimony from a 1795 conspiracy trial. I present a framework for analysing scribal intervention in discourse reporting and show that, although the transcription conventions of historical criminal proceedings offer the appearance of being objective representations, recorded testimony privileges idealised representations of speech events. In fact, a special status is given to those speech events to which those in the courtroom were not privy, that is, hearsay. When scribes use Direct Discourse to report this type of speech, they are simultaneously marking it as evidence available for judicial decision-making and distancing themselves from the judgment and interpretation process. I show that this is particularly problematic for interpreted testimony. This has implications for both our understanding of historical courtroom processes and the use of trial transcripts for historical sociolinguistic and pragmatic analysis.

中文翻译：

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重复、想象、道听途说

在本文中，我分析了 1795 年阴谋审判证词中报道的话语的表述。我提出了一个分析话语报告中的抄写干预的框架，并表明，尽管历史刑事诉讼的转录惯例提供了客观表征的外观，但记录的证词特权是对言语事件的理想化表征。事实上，那些法庭上不知情的言论事件被赋予了一种特殊的地位，即道听途说。当抄写员使用直接话语来报道此类言论时，他们同时将其标记为可供司法决策使用的证据，并远离了判决和解释过程。我表明这对于解释证词来说尤其成问题。