Semantic and soritical paradoxes display remarkable family resemblances. For one thing, several non-classical logics have been independently applied to both kinds of paradoxes. For another, revenge paradoxes and higher-order vagueness—among the most serious problems targeting solutions to semantic and soritical paradoxes—exhibit a rather similar dynamics. Some authors have taken these facts to suggest that truth and vagueness require a unified logical framework, or perhaps that the truth predicate is itself vague. However, a common core of semantic and soritical paradoxes has not been identified yet, and no explanation of their relationships has been provided. Here we aim at filling this lacuna, in the framework of many-valued logics. We provide a unified diagnosis of semantic and soritical paradoxes, identifying their source in a general form of indiscernibility. We then develop our diagnosis into a theory of paradoxicality, which formalizes both semantic and soritical paradoxes as arguments involving specific instances of our generalized indiscernibility principle, and correctly predicts which logics can non-trivially solve them.

语义和社会悖论表现出惊人的家族相似性。一方面，几种非经典逻辑已独立应用于这两种悖论。另一方面，复仇悖论和高阶模糊性——这是针对语义和社会悖论解决方案的最严重的问题——表现出相当相似的动态。一些作者认为这些事实表明真理和模糊性需要一个统一的逻辑框架，或者也许真理谓词本身就是模糊的。然而，语义和社会悖论的共同核心尚未确定，也没有提供它们之间关系的解释。在这里，我们的目标是在多值逻辑的框架内填补这一空白。我们提供语义和社会悖论的统一诊断，以一般难以辨别的形式识别它们的来源。然后，我们将我们的诊断发展成一种悖论理论，它将语义悖论和逻辑悖论形式化为涉及我们广义不可辨别性原则的具体实例的论证，并正确预测哪些逻辑可以不平凡地解决它们。