A monopolistic manufacturer produces a branded good that is sold to final consumers by a monopolistic retailer who also sells a private label. The costs of the private label are unobserved by the manufacturer, which affects the terms of the contract offered by the manufacturer to the retailer. Given the revelation principle, the manufacturer distorts the quantity of the branded product downwards to learn those costs. The manufacturer can further reduce the retailer's information rent by distorting the quantity of the private label upwards—but this quantity is typically beyond its control. The optimum can nonetheless be achieved when combining a quantity discount with an end-of-year repayment.

中文翻译：

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自有品牌信息不对称的批发定价*

垄断制造商生产品牌商品，由同时销售自有品牌的垄断零售商出售给最终消费者。制造商没有注意到自有品牌的成本，这影响了制造商向零售商提供的合同条款。根据揭示原则，制造商会向下扭曲品牌产品的数量以了解这些成本。制造商可以通过向上扭曲自有品牌的数量来进一步降低零售商的信息租金，但这个数量通常超出了其控制范围。尽管如此，将数量折扣与年终还款相结合仍能达到最佳效果。