This article contributes to discussions about the problem of evil and Schelling studies by analysing Schelling's conception of the problem in his 1809 Freiheitsschrift essay. I explicate Schelling's critical response to four classic solutions to the problem (embodiment, degree, dualism, and divine forms) and outline his positive solution. My thesis is that Schelling offers a unique theodicy by arguing for a dialectical conception of the infinite omnipotence of God. In contrast to traditional notions of the infinite as the opposite of the finite, Schelling claims that God is only truly infinite if also embodied in the finite, an embodiment enacted through the human freedom to do evil. To explore Schelling's project, I draw parallels between his account of God's omnipotence and Hegel's ‘good infinite’ and situate Schelling's thesis within Mackie's discussion of the problem of evil in ‘Evil and Omnipotence’.

中文翻译：

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谢林与邪恶问题

本文通过分析谢林在 1809 年的问题概念，为有关邪恶问题和谢林研究的讨论做出了贡献。自由文本散文。我阐述了谢林对该问题的四种经典解决方案（体现、程度、二元论和神圣形式）的批判性回应，并概述了他的积极解决方案。我的论点是，谢林通过论证上帝无限全能的辩证概念，提供了独特的神义论。与将无限作为有限对立面的传统观念相反，谢林声称，上帝只有体现在有限之中，才是真正的无限，这是通过人类作恶的自由而制定的。为了探索谢林的计划，我将他对上帝全能的描述与黑格尔的“善无限”进行了比较，并将谢林的论文置于麦基在《邪恶与全能》中对邪恶问题的讨论中。