Moral rules and social norms influence whether individuals break the law. We characterize optimal law enforcement when some individuals obey internalized moral rules and implement social norms for other individuals who prefer to comply with them. Moral individuals and norm followers are linked via the endogenous social norm and this induces the social planner to create an expected sanction for norm setters that is higher than without the link. The optimal expected sanction for moral individuals is higher than the one for norm followers if the moral rule is weak but the reverse ranking is true when it is strong.

中文翻译：

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当个人是道德或规范追随者时，最佳执法

道德规则和社会规范影响个人是否违法。当一些人遵守内在的道德规则并为其他愿意遵守这些规则的人实施社会规范时，我们就描述了最佳执法。道德个体和规范追随者通过内生的社会规范联系在一起，这促使社会规划者为规范制定者制定比没有联系时更高的预期制裁。如果道德规则较弱，则对道德个体的最佳预期制裁高于对规范追随者的预期制裁，但当道德规则较强时，则相反。