The energy transition requires the deployment of risky research and development programs, most of which are partially financed by public funding. Recent recovery plans, associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and the energy transition, increased the funding available to finance innovative low-carbon projects and called for an economic evaluation of their allocation. This paper analyzes the potential benefit of using repayable advance: a lump-sum payment to finance the project that is paid back in case of success. The relationship between the state and innovative firms is formalized in the principal-agent framework. Investing in an innovative project requires an initial observable capital outlay. We introduce asymmetric information on the probability of success, which is known to the firm but not to the state agency. The outcome of the project, if successful, delivers a private benefit to the firm and an external social benefit to the state. In this context a repayable advance consists in rewarding failure. We prove that it is a superior strategy in the presence of pure adverse selection. We investigate under what conditions this result could be extended in the presence of moral hazard. Implications for green industrial policy are discussed.

中文翻译：

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绿色产业政策、信息不对称与应缴预付款


能源转型需要部署有风险的研发项目，其中大部分项目的部分资金来自公共资金。最近与 COVID-19 大流行和能源转型相关的复苏计划增加了可用于资助创新低碳项目的资金，并呼吁对其分配进行经济评估。本文分析了使用可偿还预付款的潜在好处：为项目提供一次性付款，并在成功后偿还。国家与创新企业之间的关系在委托代理框架中正式化。投资创新项目需要初始可观察的资本支出。我们引入了关于成功概率的不对称信息，这些信息为公司所知，但为国家机构所知。该项目的成果如果成功，将为公司带来私人利益，并为国家带来外部社会利益。在这种情况下，可偿还的预付款包括奖励失败。我们证明，在存在纯粹逆向选择的情况下，这是一种优越的策略。我们调查在存在道德风险的情况下，在什么条件下可以延长这一结果。讨论了绿色产业政策的影响。