My aim in this article is to provide an account of practical judgement, for Kant, that situates it within his theory of judgement as a whole – particularly, with regards to the distinction between the determining and reflecting use of judgement. I argue that practical judgement is a kind of determining judgement, but also one in which reflecting judgement plays a significant role. More specifically, I claim that practical judgement arises from the cooperation of the reflecting power of judgement with the faculty of reason – the former assisting the latter in the application of its principle. I conclude by considering a possible role for feeling in practical judgement.

中文翻译：

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理性的反思：康德论实践判断

我写这篇文章的目的是为康德提供一个关于实际判断的解释，将其置于他的整个判断理论中——特别是关于判断的决定性使用和反映性使用之间的区别。我认为，实践判断是一种决定性判断，但也是一种反思性判断发挥重要作用的判断。更具体地说，我认为实践判断源于判断的反映力与理性能力的合作——前者协助后者应用其原则。最后，我考虑了感觉在实际判断中可能发挥的作用。