In this paper, we first review the finance literature on managerial risk-taking incentives that is based on various fixed effect models (FEs). Second, we discuss the differences between industry and firm FEs with overall-, between-, and within-variations in corporate policies. Third, we investigate the effect of managerial risk-taking incentives on the values and decisions of firms as examples to support the discussion. Following Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006), we use Vega to measure the incentives. Our empirical results except for R&D expenditures show that a firm FE provides results consistent with other studies when we examine the effect of Vega on the values and decisions of firms. The evidence supports the idea that firms with high Vegas may have low values and capital expenditures, and high leverages and high payouts.

在本文中，我们首先回顾了基于各种固定效应模型（FE）的管理风险承担激励的金融文献。其次，我们讨论行业和公司有限元之间的差异以及公司政策的整体、之间和内部变化。第三，我们研究了管理风险承担激励对企业价值观和决策的影响，作为支持讨论的例子。继 Coles、Daniel 和 Naveen（2006）之后，我们使用 Vega 来衡量激励措施。除研发支出外，我们的实证结果表明，当我们检验 Vega 对企业价值观和决策的影响时，企业 FE 提供的结果与其他研究一致。有证据支持这样的观点：维加斯较高的公司可能具有较低的价值和资本支出，以及较高的杠杆率和较高的支出。