This paper studies how target industry takeover competition affects shareholder gains around mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We find that target industries with higher M&A activity negatively (positively) affect bidder (target) announcement returns, while the impact on bidder-target combined returns is negligible. The results corroborate the overpayment argument of acquiring targets from competitive industries. Importantly, we document that the lower bidder announcement returns associated with higher industry takeover competition are mitigated when bidders are from countries with better institutional quality, suggesting that country governance can prevent bidder managers from overpaying the targets.

本文研究了目标行业收购竞争如何影响并购 (M&A) 中的股东收益。我们发现，并购活动较高的目标行业对投标人（目标公司）公告收益产生负面（正向）影响，而对投标人与目标公司的综合回报率的影响可以忽略不计。结果证实了从竞争性行业收购目标时支付过高的论点。重要的是，我们记录了，当投标人来自机构质量较好的国家时，与较高行业收购竞争相关的较低投标人公告回报会得到缓解，这表明国家治理可以防止投标人管理者支付过高的目标费用。