Purpose

Within a framework of supply chain (SC) coordination, this paper analyzes a green SC consisting of a retailer and a manufacturer, under government incentives and legislations and the consumer environmental awareness. To mitigate carbon emissions and promote the sustainability of the SC, a customized carbon emission trading mechanism is developed.

Design/methodology/approach

A game-theoretical decision model formulated determines the optimal sustainability level and the optimal quota of carbon credit from the ceiling capacity set by the government. In order to coordinate the SC and optimize environmental decisions, a novel combination of consignment and zero wholesale price contracts is proposed.

Findings

Analytical and numerical analyses conducted highlight that the proposed contract generates a Pareto improvement for both channel members, boosts the profit of the green SC, enhances the sustainability level of the channel and contributes to a reduction in the requested carbon emission credit by the manufacturer.

Social implications

With the proposed mechanism, governments can protect their industries and, more importantly, comply with European Union (EU) rules on annually reducing emission ceilings allocated to industries.

Originality/value

Different from previous studies on cap-and-trade strategies, the proposed mechanism enables companies to select lower emission quota/allowances than the maximum amount set by the government, and in return, companies can benefit from several incentive strategies of the government.

中文翻译：

---

供应链协调：定制限额与交易和消费者环境意识下寄售和零批发价格合同的应用

目的

在供应链（SC）协调的框架内，本文分析了在政府激励和立法以及消费者环境意识下由零售商和制造商组成的绿色供应链。为了减少碳排放并促进SC的可持续性，开发了定制的碳排放交易机制。

设计/方法论/途径

制定博弈论决策模型，根据政府设定的上限确定最优可持续水平和最优碳信用额度。为了协调 SC 并优化环境决策，提出了一种寄售合同和零批发价格合同的新颖组合。

发现

分析和数值分析强调，拟议的合同为两个渠道成员带来了帕累托改进，提高了绿色供应商的利润，提高了渠道的可持续性水平，并有助于减少制造商要求的碳排放信用额。

社会影响

通过拟议的机制，政府可以保护其工业，更重要的是，遵守欧盟（EU）关于每年降低分配给工业的排放上限的规则。

原创性/价值

与以往关于限额与交易策略的研究不同，该机制使企业能够选择低于政府设定的最高限额的排放配额/配额，作为回报，企业可以从政府的多种激励策略中受益。