Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have mushroomed over the last decades. However, the various forms of bi- and plurilateral arrangements have always been met with the concern that their proliferation might come at the expense of overall trade freedom because of undermining multilateral governance. This paper starts from the fact that international treaties are notoriously difficult to enforce, as is compliance with (trade) agreements. By focusing on the political economy of how cooperation in trade liberalization is ultimately sustained via the threat of retaliation as institutionalized within the World Trade Organization (WTO), the paper illuminates a novel and completely different channel between PTA membership and multilateral trade liberalization. Exploring their interaction with respect to trade freedom, we explain that PTA membership actually improves on the working of multilateral arrangements that are supposed to ensure cooperation in trade liberalization, thus effectively catering to more open trade.

过去几十年来，优惠贸易协定（PTA）如雨后春笋般涌现。然而，各种形式的双边和诸边安排一直受到人们的担忧，即它们的扩散可能会因为破坏多边治理而以牺牲整体贸易自由为代价。本文从以下事实出发：众所周知，国际条约的执行非常困难，遵守（贸易）协议也是如此。本文重点关注如何通过世界贸易组织 (WTO) 内制度化的报复威胁最终维持贸易自由化合作的政治经济学，阐明了 PTA 成员身份与多边贸易自由化之间的一种新颖且完全不同的渠道。通过探讨它们在贸易自由方面的相互作用，我们解释说，PTA 成员资格实际上改善了旨在确保贸易自由化合作的多边安排的运作，从而有效地迎合更加开放的贸易。