We distinguish between different problems of “aboutness”: the “hard” problem of explaining the everyday phenomenon of intentionality and three less challenging “easy” sets of problems concerning the posits of folk psychology, the notions of representation invoked in the mind-brain sciences, and the intensionality (with an “s”) of mental language. The problem of intentionality is especially hard in that, as is the case with the hard problem of phenomenal consciousness, there is no clear path to a solution using current methods. We argue that naturalistic theories of mental representation do not address the hard problem—either they are only intended to address the easy problems, or the claims they make help address the problem of intentionality only under undefended and prima facie implausible assumptions to the effect that the hard problem reduces to some combination of the easy problems. We offer a positive account of what would be required to properly face up to the problem of intentionality.

中文翻译：

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正视意向性问题

我们区分不同的“关于性”问题：解释意向性日常现象的“困难”问题，以及涉及民间心理学假设、心脑科学中引用的表征概念的三组挑战性较小的“简单”问题。 ，以及心理语言的内涵性（带有“s”）。意向性问题尤其困难，因为与现象意识的难题一样，使用现有方法没有明确的解决方案。我们认为，心理表征的自然主义理论并没有解决难题——要么它们只是为了解决简单的问题，要么它们提出的主张只有在毫无辩护且表面上难以置信的假设下才有助于解决意向性问题，即困难问题简化为简单问题的某种组合。我们对正确面对意向性问题所需要做的事情提供了积极的描述。