The core of the study is a critical comparison of Nietzsche’s notion of Übermensch, and its transhumanist rewriting into different variants of the posthuman. The first part contextualizes transhumanist thought, primarily in relation to certain evolutionary ideas that, in their totality, exhibit a fundamental anthropological deficit: they speak of the evolutionary overcoming of human, but the limit of sensibility that attempts to imagine a future human being is only the mere negation of what human has been so far. In this way, the posthuman is not removed from the somewhat vague context of the technological “extension” of previous humanity. In this respect, the whole concept is grossly unaesthetic. The second part shows that Nietzsche’s rethinking of the overhuman was intertwined with other anthropological structures, for example, the idea of Mitfreude (‘shared joy’), which is supposed to creatively (in the manner of art) replace the morally misleading notion of compassion. The Übermensch therefore enabled Nietzsche to propose a different conception of intersubjectivity; one that would no longer be reduced to contempt for the human being. The third section traces the causes of the transhumanist failure in productive imagination. It is based on the hypothesis that this failure is driven by an unconscious preference for the figure of the comic book Superman. It postulates, through a Kantian conception of the sublime, that an adequate elaboration of the image of the posthuman cannot do without an affective component that would allow for Bejahung (‘affirmation’). Only the artificial will always appear, to some degree, as alien, and therefore will never transcend the limits of reactive adaptation. A living posthuman could only emerge if he offered anthropological techniques of the art of living. Therefore, transhumanism continuously raises anthropological questions, especially regarding the problem of the extent to which the artificiality of art can be identified with technology. Without proper answers, it will not achieve the complexity of Nietzsche’s overhuman, and will always only dilute him into technological supplements. The posthuman will come into being when he is conceived as a grandiose work of art.

中文翻译：

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超人类主义：超人类的友善面孔和漫画《超人》

该研究的核心是对尼采的概念进行批判性比较超人，及其超人类主义重写为后人类的不同变体。第一部分将超人类主义思想置于语境中，主要涉及某些进化思想，这些思想总体上表现出人类学的基本缺陷：它们谈到了人类的进化克服，但试图想象未来人类的感性极限只是仅仅是对人类迄今为止的状态的否定。通过这种方式，后人类并没有脱离前人类的技术“延伸”的有点模糊的背景。在这方面，整个概念非常不美观。第二部分表明尼采对超人的重新思考与其他人类学结构交织在一起，例如，米特弗洛伊德（“共享欢乐”），它应该创造性地（以艺术的方式）取代道德上误导性的同情概念。因此，超人使尼采能够提出一种不同的主体间性概念。一个将不再沦为对人类的蔑视的人。第三部分追溯了超人类主义在富有成效的想象力方面失败的原因。它基于这样的假设：这种失败是由于对漫画书超人形象的无意识偏好造成的。它通过康德的崇高概念假设，对后人类形象的充分阐述离不开情感成分，而情感成分将允许贝贾洪（'肯定'）。只有人造物在某种程度上总是显得陌生，因此永远不会超越反应性适应的限制。只有提供生活艺术的人类学技术，一个活着的后人类才能出现。因此，超人类主义不断提出人类学问题，特别是关于艺术的人工性在多大程度上可以与技术等同的问题。没有正确的答案，就达不到尼采超人的复杂性，而永远只会把他稀释成技术的补充。当后人类被视为一件宏伟的艺术品时，他就会诞生。