A wide variety of concepts are nowadays considered to be hyperintensional, and some of them do not seem to involve our representational attitudes. This led some philosophers to identify and defend a notion of worldly hyperintensionality: the idea that some hyperintensional phenomena derive from features of objective reality, independently of how we represent it. Against this view, Darragh Byrne and Naomi Thompson argue that the correct understanding of such phenomena must be conceptualist in nature, and claim that hyperintensionality always derives from features of representations. In the present work I defend the genuine distinction between worldly and representational hyperintensionality through a new framing of the issue: the comparison with worldly intensionality. I argue that locating the sources of hyperintensionality should not be affected by preferences towards any specific semantic framework, and reject Byrne and Thompson's argument against worldly hyperintensionality.

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超内涵性的来源

如今，各种各样的概念被认为是超内涵的，其中一些概念似乎并不涉及我们的表象态度。这导致一些哲学家识别并捍卫了世俗超内涵性的概念：一些超内涵现象源自客观现实的特征，与我们如何表示它无关。反对这种观点，达拉格·伯恩和内奥米·汤普森认为，对此类现象的正确理解本质上必须是概念主义的，并声称超内涵性总是源自表象的特征。在目前的工作中，我通过一个新的问题框架来捍卫世俗超内涵性和表征超内涵性之间的真正区别：与世俗内涵性的比较。我认为，定位超内涵性的来源不应受到对任何特定语义框架的偏好的影响，并拒绝伯恩和汤普森反对世俗超内涵性的论点。