Abstract: Policy makers and antitrust authorities are concerned about the lack of competition in the fuel retail market and its impact on consumer prices. The aim of this article is to empirically evaluate the role of the intensity of competition and competitors' brand affiliation on retail fuel prices. To this end, we use a panel data set with detailed daily on nearly 8,500 gas stations and 2 million price observations; we estimate a reduced-form fuel price equation that accounts for supply (input costs and local competition) and demand shifters (income, traffic intensity, and location) as well as for brand and time fixed effects. We use an instrumental variable estimation strategy, to account for the endogeneity of the intensity of competition. Our results show that premium brands and low-cost brands affect the prices of rival firms in an opposite way. On the one hand, premium brands soften competition in the local markets where they operate and thereby allow their rivals to set higher prices. Besides, price setting by premium-brand stations react differently depending on whether the nearest rival sells the same brand (a friendly competitor) or some other brand. By contrast, low-cost brands contribute to reducing prices through their own prices (direct effect), thereby encouraging competitors to lower their prices (indirect effect). Our results suggest that regulation limiting the entry of premium operators whilst promoting the entry of low cost gas stations will enhance competition at the retail level.

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竞争和竞争对手：来自零售燃料市场的证据

摘要：政策制定者和反垄断机构担心燃料零售市场缺乏竞争及其对消费者价格的影响。本文的目的是实证评估竞争强度和竞争对手的品牌归属对零售燃油价格的作用。为此，我们使用了面板数据集，每天详细记录近 8,500 个加油站和 200 万个价格观察结果；我们估计了一个简化形式的燃料价格方程，该方程考虑了供应（投入成本和当地竞争）和需求转移因素（收入、交通强度和位置）以及品牌和时间固定效应。我们使用工具变量估计策略来解释竞争强度的内生性。我们的结果表明，高端品牌和低成本品牌以相反的方式影响竞争对手公司的价格。一方面，优质品牌削弱了其经营所在当地市场的竞争，从而使竞争对手能够设定更高的价格。此外，优质品牌电台的定价反应也不同，具体取决于最近的竞争对手销售的是同一品牌（友好的竞争对手）还是其他品牌。相比之下，低成本品牌通过自身价格有助于降低价格（直接效应），从而鼓励竞争对手降低价格（间接效应）。我们的研究结果表明，限制优质运营商进入同时促进低成本加油站进入的监管将增强零售层面的竞争。