当前位置: X-MOL 学术Journal of Public Economic Theory › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Double auction for trading perfect complements
Journal of Public Economic Theory ( IF 1.336 ) Pub Date : 2023-10-30 , DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12672
Rakesh Chaturvedi 1 , Ashish Kumar Pandey 2
Affiliation  

For a trading problem where a buyer is interested in an aggregate resource with fragmented ownership, the individually owned resources are perfect complements in trade. A double auction, chosen in accordance with a value alignment principle which we formulate, is shown to be strategy proof for owners. Since it also values the aggregate resource correctly, it mitigates the holdout problem by changing the source of inefficiency from complementarity on owners' side to lack of competition on buyer side. The value alignment principle implies that this double auction has a majority trading rule. With multiple buyers, a suitable modification makes the double auction strategy proof even for the buyers, thus mitigating the holdout problem by achieving approximate ex post efficiency when the number of owners is large.

中文翻译:

双重拍卖,完美互补交易

对于买家对所有权分散的聚合资源感兴趣的交易问题,个人拥有的资源是贸易中的完美补充。根据我们制定的价值调整原则选择的双重拍卖被证明是业主的策略证明。由于它还正确地评估了总资源,因此它通过将低效率的根源从所有者方面的互补性转变为买方方面缺乏竞争来缓解坚持问题。价值对齐原则意味着本次双重拍卖具有多数交易规则。对于多个买家,适当的修改使得双重拍卖策略即使对于买家来说也是有效的,从而在业主数量较多时通过实现近似的事后效率来缓解坚持问题。
更新日期:2023-10-30
down
wechat
bug