This paper explores the role of restrictions on the use of international reserves as economic sanctions. We develop a simple model of the strategic game between a sanctioning (creditor) country and a sanctioned (debtor) country. We characterize how the sanctioning country should impose restrictions optimally, internalizing the geopolitical benefits and the potential losses of a default by the sanctioned country. A calibrated version of the model can account for the sequence of events leading to the Russian default. Moreover, it suggests that for every dollar of economic damage inflicted to Russia, the US is willing to give up 0.50 dollars of its own consumption.

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关于战争、制裁和主权违约

本文探讨了限制使用国际储备作为经济制裁的作用。我们开发了一个简单的制裁国（债权国）和受制裁国（债务国）之间的战略博弈模型。我们描述了制裁国应如何最佳地实施限制，将地缘政治利益和受制裁国违约的潜在损失内部化。该模型的校准版本可以解释导致俄罗斯违约的事件顺序。此外，它还表明，每给俄罗斯造成一美元的经济损失，美国就愿意放弃0.5美元的本国消费。