In a cooperative game with a coalition structure (i.e., coalition structure game), a coalition structure value (CS-value) is obtained on the assumption that the coalition structure has been or can be formed. The necessity analysis of coalition formation is easy to be ignored in the CS-values, such as the Owen value. In this paper, the alignment probability of other coalitions out of a priori coalition is considered as an affection, so that the relative value as a new CS-value is proposed. By different extension of splitting axioms, three kinds of relative values are introduced and axiomatized. These relative values not only take consideration of existing coalition structure, but also other possible coalition structures. Thus, the relative values for a coalition structure in this study are more stable than the Owen value, because the potential affection of other coalition structures is taken into consideration.

在具有联盟结构的合作博弈（即联盟结构博弈）中，在联盟结构已经形成或能够形成的假设下获得联盟结构值（CS值）。CS值中，如欧文值，很容易忽视联盟形成的必要性分析。本文将先验联盟之外的其他联盟的对齐概率视为一种影响，从而提出了相对值作为新的CS值。通过对分裂公理的不同扩展，引入并公理化了三种相对值。这些相对值不仅考虑了现有的联盟结构，还考虑了其​​他可能的联盟结构。因此，本研究中联盟结构的相对值比欧文值更稳定，因为考虑了其他联盟结构的潜在影响。