A central premise of the U.S. No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) was that test-based accountability systems would break through local politics and lead districts to prioritize the needs of disadvantaged students. Yet, no research examines the equity-related effects of NCLB’s district accountability system. Focusing on a state with rich data, we find that negative ratings (which put districts at higher risk of state intervention) led to the disenrollment of economically disadvantaged students (ostensibly leading to a decline in income-based school segregation) and a corresponding (suspicious) jump in test scores. Negative ratings also led to changes in collectively bargained personnel policies and the replacement of teachers in disadvantaged students’ schools. There was no redistribution of funds toward disadvantaged students’ schools, however, and likely minimal impact on district elections. The results put into question whether a shift in district governance helps explain NCLB’s well-documented positive impacts on low-income students’ academic outcomes.

美国《不让一个孩子掉队法案》（NCLB）的核心前提是，基于考试的问责制将突破地方政治，引导学区优先考虑弱势学生的需求。然而，尚无研究探讨 NCLB 地区问责制对公平相关的影响。着眼于一个拥有丰富数据的州，我们发现负面评级（这使学区面临国家干预的更高风险）导致经济弱势学生退学（表面上导致基于收入的学校隔离减少）以及相应的（可疑的） ）考试成绩跃升。负面评价还导致集体谈判人事政策的变化以及弱势学生学校教师的更换。然而，没有向弱势学生学校重新分配资金，对地区选举的影响可能很小。结果令人质疑地区治理的转变是否有助于解释 NCLB 对低收入学生学业成绩的积极影响。